An Empirical Model of Search with Vertically Differentiated Products by Matthijs R Wildenbeest
An Empirical Model of Search with Vertically
Differentiated Products
Matthijs R. Wildenbeesty
First draft: November 2006
Current version: April 2009
Abstract
This paper presents a non-sequential search model that allows for vertical product dieren-
tiation. In the unique symmetric equilibrium rms with dierent characteristics draw utilities
from a common utility distribution, resulting in asymmetric price distributions. The model
therefore provides a theoretical rationale for explaining price dispersion as a result of quality
dierences and search frictions together. More specically, the model can explain the frequent
and asymmetric price changes reported in several empirical papers, but also why some rms have
persistently higher prices than others. Using the equilibrium conditions derived from the model,
we show how to estimate search costs by maximum likelihood using only prices. The method is
applied to a data set of prices for grocery items from supermarkets in the UK. Estimates reveal
that most of the observed price variation can be explained by supermarket heterogeneity and
that the estimated amount of search is low in this market. We show that ignoring vertical prod-
uct dierentiation results in an overestimation of search costs. Moreover, estimated search costs
using a basket of organic items are on average higher than that of a similar non-organic basket.
We also simulate how changes in search costs will aect behavior of stores and consumers.
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Price dispersion is an observed feature in many markets. Recent empirical studies have documented
substantial price dispersion in markets for grocery products (Lach, 2002), mutual funds (Horta csu
and Syverson, 2004), online electronics (Baye, Morgan, and Scholten, 2004), and online books
(Hong and Shum, 2006).
Figure 1 provides another example of price dispersion by looking at the prices charged for
Golden Delicious apples at four major supermarkets in the United Kingdom between September
and October 2008. Several factors may have contributed to the relatively large dierences in prices
across sellers. First, a large theoretical literature on consumer search behavior (e.g., Reinganum,
1979; Burdett and Judd, 1983; Stahl, 1989; Janssen and Moraga-Gonz alez, 2004) has shown that
imperfect information about sellers' prices may lead to equilibrium price dispersion.1 Second,
Golden Delicious apples are particularly prone to bruising and shriveling and supermarkets might
dier in service levels oered, so product dierentiation oers another explanation for the observed
dierences in prices.
Figure 1: Prices Golden Delicious apples
The substantial variation in prices at a given point in time shown in Figure 1 as well as the
persistence of the price dispersion over time are consistent with a product dierentiation as well as a
search friction explanation. However, Figure 1 also suggests that some supermarkets set on average
higher prices for Golden Delicious apples than others, while at the same time three out of four
supermarkets change their prices of apples frequently, and { more importantly { not necessarily in
similar ways. Although the rst observation is consistent with a product dierentiation explanation,
1For an overview of studies on price dispersion, see Baye, Morgan, and Scholten (2006).
2unless the seemingly random changes in prices have gone together with changes in the quality
of the apples oered these observed pricing patterns are dicult to explain using the product
dierentiation explanation alone. On the other hand, while search models can explain random
pricing patterns (e.g., Burdett and Judd, 1983; Stahl, 1989), at the same time they cannot explain
why some rms have higher average prices than others.
Although several other papers have found evidence for both randomness and persistent dier-
ences in average prices (e.g., Lach, 2002; Baye, Morgan, and Scholten, 2004; Lewis, 2007), the
current literature on consumer search behavior lacks a theoretical foundation to explain both si-
multaneously. In this paper we will present a model that combines the two and as such is able
to rationalize the observed pricing patterns better than product dierentiation models and search
models individually. More specically, we examine the impact of search frictions on the compet-
itiveness of a market for products that are dierentiated in terms of quality. We show that in
equilibrium rms randomly draw prices from asymmetric price distributions. Average prices are
linked to vertical characteristics, which means the search model in this paper can explain random
pricing patterns, but unlike other existing search models it also oers an explanation why some
rms have persistently higher or lower average prices than other rms. To the best of our knowledge
this feature is novel in the literature.2
In the second part of the paper we use the structure of the equilibrium model to estimate
both search costs and the impact of vertical product dierentiation on prices. We show that the
model can be estimated by maximum likelihood using only price data. We apply the estimation
method to price data from supermarkets in the United Kingdom.3 The data covers the period
between August and October 2008. The estimation results point out that the model does quite
well in explaining observed prices of a basket of staple items across the four major supermarket
chains in the UK. Our estimates indicate that around 61% of the variation in prices is explained by
supermarket heterogeneity, while the rest of the variation is due to search frictions. Besides that we
nd that the amount of search is relatively low; about 91% of consumers search at most two times.
Average price-to-cost margins are estimated to be between 8% and 9%, which seems reasonable
2Although Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999) allow for horizontal product dierentiation, their
models do not generate price dispersion.
3Several studies have recently looked at competition in the UK supermarket industry. Smith (2004) estimates a
model of consumer choice and expenditure and nds that mergers between the largest rms will lead to price increases
of up to 7.4%. Smith (2006) analyzes store location and size using a characteristics utility model estimated with
individual consumer data. Although the focus of this paper will be on supermarket choice as well, our study diers
from previous ones in the sense that we will mainly concentrate on how supermarket choice relates to consumer search
behavior. An advantage of our method is that we only need price data, although this means that unlike previous
studies using more detailed data, we are unable to control for horizontal product dierentiation.
3for this sector.4 We show that ignoring the vertical product dierentiation component leads to an
overestimation of search frictions, which can explain the relatively high search cost estimates found
by others in the past.
Our data set also includes prices on organic items, which provides us with a natural case to
investigate how search costs relate to consumer demographics: organic food purchasers tend to
have distinct characteristics and several studies have shown that consumers of organic grocery
items have on average higher incomes. We conduct an experiment in which we compare our search
cost estimates to estimates obtained using a basket of only organic items and nd that organic
food purchasers have higher search costs on average. These dierence might be explained by De
los Santos (2008), who nds a signicant negative relationship between income and the time spent
searching.
Our paper ts within the recent literature on the structural estimation of consumer search
models. Hong and Shum (2006) estimate search cost distributions in a homogenous good setting
by maximum empirical likelihood using only price data. Moraga-Gonz alez and Wildenbeest (2008)
show that a maximum likelihood approach can improve on their results. Horta csu and Syverson
(2004) also estimate search costs in a model of vertical product dierentiation. An important
dierence is that price dispersion in Horta csu and Syverson (2004) is the result of rms playing
pure strategies, while in our model it is the result of mixed strategies. This means our model is
capable of explaining random pricing patterns as we observe in our data. Moreover, in a mixed
strategy equilibrium prots need to be the same across rms, which gives an extra condition that
can be used for the estimation of the model. The extra condition makes that here only price data
is needed to estimate the model, while Horta csu and Syverson (2004) need both price and quantity
data. This is important since in many settings the econometrician only observes prices.
In a related empirical paper, Lach (2002) studies existence and persistence of price dispersion
using price data of four dierent products in Israel. Several predictions from search models are
tested and he nds the patterns in the price data to be in line with these predictions. Lach (2002)
controls for dierences between rms in a similar way as we do here. In that sense, the analysis
presented here shows that vertical product dierentiation can be captured in a theoretical model
in such a way that Lach's approach is theoretically justied. Moreover, our paper goes one step
further by using the structure of the theoretical search model to estimate the underlying search
cost distribution.
In terms of policy implications, Armstrong (2008) argues that especially when there are in-
4Smith (2004) reports gross margins that are between 11% and 14% for the year 2000.
4formation frictions competition policy may occasionally harm some consumers. Indeed, we nd
evidence in our data that a policy to encourage people to visit price comparison sites will hurt most
grocery shoppers. Using the estimated search cost distribution as a starting point, we nd that
increasing the share of consumers with very low search costs results in higher prices being charged
by the supermarkets. More consumers with very low search costs makes it more costly for rms to
set very low prices. Stores will start focusing more on the consumers with relatively high search
costs, with higher prices and overall higher prot margins for the stores as a result.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the next section we discuss the theoretical model.
Section 3 continues with a method to estimate search costs using maximum likelihood. In Section
4 we apply the estimation method to price data from supermarkets. The last section concludes.
2 The model
We study a model of rms oering a dierentiated good competing for incompletely informed con-
sumers. On the supply side there are N rms, indexed by j, producing goods at a unit cost rj.
The goods are vertically dierentiated, i.e., the goods can be ranked according to their character-
istics and consumers all agree in the ranking. The model can be used to address two sources of
product dierentiation. The goods can be dierentiated either because the goods themselves are
heterogeneous, for example because the products have dierent features. It could also be that the
good is homogeneous, but that the rms selling the product are dierentiated. An example of this
would be stores selling the same products but oering dierent service levels.
On the demand side there is a continuum of consumers demanding at most one good, all deriving
the same utility from consumption of good j:
uj(Xj;pj;) = Xj   pj + j; (1)
where Xj are the observable characteristics of the good, pj is the price of rm j's good, j are (by
the econometrician) unobservable characteristics of good j and where the parameter  describes
the relation between Xj and uj. Since the coecient of price is normalized to  1, utilities are
measured in the same unit as prices. In what follows, let vj  Xj + j; we shall refer to vj as the
valuation for the good produced by rm j. Consumers know their valuation for the good produced
at the dierent rms but prices are only observed after searching. By engaging in costly search
the consumers can gain information about the prices of the goods and thus the utilities derived
from the goods at a subset of the rms. Consumers are characterized by their search cost c, which
5is a random draw from the distribution function G(c), with density function g(c). We assume
consumers search non-sequentially, i.e., consumers determine before entering the market how many
times to search.5 Consumers then buy the product from the rm in their sample providing the
highest utility level.
Firms and consumers play a simultaneous move game. The store characteristics are assumed to
be drawn from some distribution and are xed in the short run. We assume the dierence between
valuation and unit cost vj rj to be the same across rms, i.e., x = vj rj, where x is the maximum
possible margin that can be attained by the rms. This means that more favorable characteristics
come at a higher cost. Moreover, by restricting vj and rj to be related in this way, as we will
show below, rms are symmetric in the margin received at each oered utility level. In this way
incentives for the rms are identical, which gives rise to the existence of a symmetric equilibrium
in utility levels.
Valuations and unit costs are common knowledge. Therefore, an individual rm takes the
pricing strategies of the other rms and the search behavior of consumers as given while setting
its own price. An individual consumer takes the rm pricing strategies as given and decides on a
number k of rms to visit in order to maximize utility. The fraction of consumers sampling k rms
is denoted by k.
We focus on symmetric equilibria in utility levels. A condition for a symmetric equilibrium in
utility levels to exist is that some consumers should search once, while others should search more
than once. The intuition for this is that if all consumers did compare prices, all rms would set a
price equal to their unit cost, which implies that all rms would be oering the same utility level
x. As a result, there is no reason to search. On the other hand, if no consumer would be willing
to compare prices, rms would set their price equal to their valuation, which means that all rms
would oer a utility level of zero. Consumers would not participate, because they have to pay a
search cost c to enter the market.6
A second condition for a symmetric equilibrium in utility levels to exist is that the rms must
play mixed strategies in setting their utility level. The proof for this is similar to the proof of
Lemma 2 of Moraga-Gonz alez, S andor, and Wildenbeest (2008) and can be explained by the idea
that oering slightly more utility gives a discrete jump in prots when dealing with consumers that
compare utilities. Hence there are no atoms in the utility distribution. On the other hand, at utility
levels close to zero only consumers searching once will buy, so in that case oering a lower utility
5The way consumers search is similar to the non-sequential search model of Burdett and Judd (1983).
6See also Lemma 1 of Moraga-Gonz alez, S andor, and Wildenbeest (2008).
6increases prots. As a result, rms draw utilities from a common atomless utility distribution,
which we denote L(u), with a lower bound equal to zero.
Consumer search behavior should be optimal. This means that for a consumer searching k
times, the expected utility should be higher than the expected cost of searching kc. Moreover, the
net benet of searching k times should be higher than the net benet of searching k   1 or k + 1
times. Now dene ck as the search cost of the consumer indierent between searching k and k + 1
times. For this consumer E[maxfu1;u2;:::;ukg]   kc = E[maxfu1;u2;:::;uk+1g]   (k + 1)c, or
ck = E[maxfu1;u2;:::;uk+1g]   E[maxfu1;u2;:::;ukg]: (2)




g(c)dc = G(ck 1)   G(ck): (3)
Now consider optimal rm behavior. Given expected consumer behavior k and expectations
on L(u), the prot of rm j oering utility uj is given by






Since x uj = pj  rj, the rst part of this equation is the margin the store makes on its product.
The second part represents the expected quantities sold, and is explained as the summation over
all N consumer groups of the share of consumers searching k times multiplied by the probability
that these k consumers visit the rm (which is k=N) and by the probability that a rm selling
the product at a utility level of uj oers the highest utility out of k rms, which is L(uj)k 1.
Given the mixed strategies, in equilibrium a store should be indierent between setting any
utility in the support of L(u). In addition, the lower bound of L(u) should be equal to zero. This is
because a rm oering a utility of zero will only sell to the consumers searching once, and surplus
extracted from these consumers is maximized by setting  pj = vj so that u = 0. In this case the
prot equation simplies to (u) = x1=N. Setting this equal to the equilibrium prots in general










Unfortunately, this equation cannot be solved for L(u), so the equilibrium distribution of utilities
7is only implicitly dened. Solving equation (4) for u gives





Although the utility distribution is the same for each rm, since u = vj  pj, the price distribution
is dierent across rms:
Fj(p) = Pr[pj  p] = Pr[p  vj   uj] = Pr[uj  vj   p] = 1   L(vj   p):
The maximum utility in the market can be found by setting L(u) = 1, which gives






Individual rms choose a utility level to maximize expected prots given expected search behavior
of the consumers and given the expected utility distribution function, so in equilibrium the rst




















k=1 k(k   1)kL(u)k 2: (7)
Using the characterization of the utility distribution equation (2) can be rewritten as a function








By using the change of variable y = L(u), we obtain dy = l(u)du. Plugging this into the equation





u(y)[(k + 1)y   k]yk 1dy: (8)
Then using the same change of variable in equation (5) we can get rid of u(y) in equation (8).
As an example, we calculate equilibrium when consumers search costs are drawn from a log-
8(a) Utility pdf (b) Price cdfs
Figure 2: Example equilibrium search model
normal distribution with parameters 0.5 and 5. Figure 2 gives plots of the equilibrium for 5 rms
with valuations ranging from 100 to 140 and x = 50 so that marginal cost range from 50 to 90.
In Figure 2(a) the equilibrium utility density is plotted. Most mass is at the extremes of the
distribution, with slightly more mass at lower utilities than at higher utilities. This shows the
tradeo rms face: set a high utility to attract consumers who compare several oerings or set a
low utility in order to maximize surplus extracted from consumers who do not search. In Figure
2(b) the equilibrium price cdfs are drawn; the dashed lines are the rms' individual price cdfs and
the solid line is the price cdf for all the rms together. What is interesting to note is that the shape
of the individual price cdfs is quite dierent from the shape of the price cdf of all rms together.
This means that assuming all rms are selling the same homogeneous product when in fact they
are not might likely lead to wrong estimates of the underlying search cost distribution. We will
come back to this issue in the empirical section.
Note that price dispersion in Horta csu and Syverson (2004) is a result of rms playing pure
strategies, while in the model presented here it is a result of mixed strategies. In a mixed strategy
equilibrium prots need to be the same across rms, which gives an extra condition that can be
used for the estimation of the model. As we will see in the next section, this extra condition makes
that here only price data is needed to estimate the model, while Horta csu and Syverson (2004)
need both price and quantity data.
3 Estimation
In this section we present a method to estimate the model presented in the previous section using
only price data. Assume the prices N rms charge for the same good are observed for a certain
9period of time, the latter being indicated by the subscript t. There are two methods to calculate
utilities from observed prices. In the rst method vj can be (superconsistently) estimated by taking
the maximum observed price  pj for each rm j during the sampling period. Since vj  Xj +j we
can rewrite equation (1) as ujt = vj pjt =  pj pjt, so corresponding utilities for all observed prices
can be calculated. The second method follows from rewriting the utility function as pjt = vj  ujt.
This equation can be estimated by carrying out a xed eects regression of prices on a constant,
i.e.,
pjt =  + j + jt;
where  is a constant, j are the rm xed eects and jt are the residuals. Note that with this
specication, valuations vj are estimated by +j and utilities are calculated by taking the negative
of the residuals jt. Moreover, jt is simply the price at time t for rm j minus the average price
of rm j within the period, which means that ujt =  jt = pj   pjt, where pj is the average
price for store j.7 In both methods utilities are calculated by restricting the shape of the price
distribution to be the same across rms (although they might have dierent means), but instead
of using the maximum observed prices across rms the second method uses the average observed
prices across rms to serve as a proxy for dierences in valuations. Although the rst method will
give superconsistent estimates of the valuations, it is very sensitive to outliers, so we will follow the
second method in what follows.
Notice that the proposed method bares resemblance with how heterogeneity in the structural
auction literature is being dealt with. Haile, Hong, and Shum (2003) provide a test for common
values in rst-price sealed-bid auctions and show that under certain conditions equilibrium bids are
additively separable into a common auction-specic component and an idiosyncratic component
(see also Hu and Shum, 2008; and Bajari, Houghton, and Tadelis, 2007). The auction specic
component is assumed to be function of observed auction characteristics, which, as shown by Haile
et al. (2003), implies the residuals of a regression of observed bids on the covariates can be treated
as normalized bids. While this method eectively deals with observed heterogeneity, our method
is dierent in the sense that it deals with unobserved heterogeneity as well.
The estimated utilities allow us to proceed as in Moraga-Gonz alez and Wildenbeest (2008) to
estimate the parameters of the model. The density function in equation (7) can be used to estimate
the search cost distribution by maximum likelihood. Since all rms are assumed to draw utilities
7For the analysis the height of the utilities is not important, all what matters are the dierences between the
utilities. This means that our estimate of the search cost distribution does not change when the same constant is
added to all valuations vj.
10from the same distribution, all the estimated utilities can simply be pooled. The log-likelihood
function is then LL =
PM
i=1 logl(ui), where M is the total number of observations. The likelihood
function can be concentrated by solving the calculated upper bound of the utility distribution in
equation (6) for x as a function of the rest of the parameters, i.e.,






and by plugging this into equation (7). In addition all k's have to add up to one, which can be
used to get rid of N. The likelihood function is then maximized with respect to the remaining
parameters of the model, i.e., k, k = 1;2;:::;N   1.
Standard errors of the k's are calculated by taking the square root of the diagonal entries of
the inverse of the negative Hessian matrix evaluated at the optimum, while in order to calculate
standard errors of the maximum possible margin x and the critical search cost values ck the Delta
method can be used.
4 Empirical analysis
As an illustration of the model and the estimation procedure, in this section we apply the estimation
method to prices collected between August and October 2008 from supermarkets in the United
Kingdom. The supermarket sector is typically a sector in which vertical product dierentiation
plays an important role. A consumer survey carried out by the UK's Competition Commission in
2000 nds that the most important determinants of store choice are, apart from the prices charged
for the groceries, whether it is possible to do the weekly shopping under one roof, whether the store
is within easy and convenient reach of home, product availability, the availability of sucient car
parking space, and 
exible opening hours. Favorable characteristics increase the utility level of the
typical visitor of a supermarket, but also come at a cost. Full-service supermarkets, focussing on
quality, are in general more expensive than for example discounters, whose primarily focus is on
low prices and not on service.
The application of our search model to supermarkets might need some additional justication.
Search models have so far been structurally estimated using data from the mutual fund industry
(Horta csu and Syverson, 2004), online book stores (Hong and Shum, 2006), and online stores selling
memory chips (Moraga-Gonz alez and Wildenbeest, 2008). All three markets have in common that
the physical location of the rm or store selling the product is of lesser importance. Conventional
11food retailers however usually tend to operate in the oine world, which means that physical lo-
cations are in fact important. Although this implies that horizontal product dierentiation issues
might be relevant, allowing for horizontal product dierentiation in addition to vertical product
dierentiation would complicate the analysis too much. We therefore ignore horizontal character-
istics, so location should be interpreted as a vertical characteristic, which can be justied by the
idea that some supermarkets in general have better locations than others.
Another assumption made in the model is that consumers search non-sequentially for the highest
utility around. Non-sequential search implies that consumers determine before they start searching
how many times to search.8 To justify this assumption one could think of consumers using adver-
tisements in for example newspapers to collect information about prices at dierent supermarkets,
the use of price comparison sites on the Internet, or a situation where there are a lot of shops
at the same distant place in town. Moreover, people typically dedicate one trip to purchase the
bulk of their grocery needs (so-called primary shopping), while the remainder of shopping trips
are used to complement the main trip (so-called secondary shopping). The supermarket picked for
the secondary shopping is not necessarily the same as the one chosen for the primary shopping
so consumers might use price information obtained during secondary shopping trips to determine
where to do their primary grocery shopping { a situation which very much resembles non-sequential
search.
In the analysis we do not explicitly take advertising into account. Through advertising con-
sumers essentially get some price information for free, so ignoring advertising puts a lower bound
on the estimated search costs. On the other hand, as will be explained in more detail below, our
focus will be on a basket of goods instead of on individual items, so ignoring advertising could be
justied on the basis of the argument that consumers are not so much interested in the prices of
only a few advertised products, but only in the price of a basket of grocery products. Our focus on
a basket of goods also helps to justify the inelastic demand assumption, since as long as the basket
is in line with average weekly shopping expenditures, the usual buyer is expected to buy a single
basket at a time.
The model is applied to a data set of prices that are collected over time, so the implicit assump-
tion is that supermarkets play a stationary repeated game of nite horizon. This means that we
are ignoring dynamic eects caused by for example loyalty cards, advertising, and switching costs.
However, since part of the share of consumers searching only one time can also be interpreted as
consumers being loyal to some supermarket, to some extent loyalty can also be accommodated in
8See Morgan and Manning (1985) for the optimality of sequential versus non-sequential search.
12the current setting.
The focus of this study will be on relatively homogeneous goods, but I allow for the possibility
that supermarkets are dierentiated in terms of the service they oer. Most theory models explain
price dispersion by either random pricing strategies of homogeneous rms or by pure strategies
of heterogeneous rms. The model described in Section 2 combines the two: heterogeneous rms
mix over price distributions with dierent support. As is shown below in some detail, in the data
set average prices across stores are persistently dierent over time, but at the same time, stores
randomize their prices. These observations make the model presented here a suitable theoreti-
cal framework to study price setting behavior of supermarkets in relation to search behavior of
consumers, as traditional search models cannot explain both things at the same time.
The setup of the empirical analysis is as follows. In the next subsection, we start by giving a
description of the data set. We check some of the implications of the model, like random pricing.
Next, we estimate the model structurally. We compare estimates obtained using our basket of
staple items with those of a similar basket that consists of only organic items. Finally, we study
what happens to equilibrium pricing and searching when there is an exogenous shift in search costs.
4.1 Description of the data
The data is collected using Tesco Price Check, a price comparison tool put by Tesco on its website.9
In addition to posting its own prices, each week Tesco collects over 10,000 prices in two branches
of each of Sainsbury's and ASDA and three branches of Morrisons around the United Kingdom.
Tesco, Sainsbury's, ASDA, and Morrisons are often called the big four; together they shared about
65% of the market in 2007. Tesco is the biggest in terms of grocery sales, followed by ASDA,
Sainsbury's, and Morrisons. The survey Tesco uses for collecting data covers only superstores. All
four have adopted a national pricing policy.10
Our data set covers a period of twelve weeks from September till October 2008. The data set
consists each week of around 14,000 products. Because the purpose of the price comparison tool
is to compare prices of Tesco with those of the other three supermarkets, all products in the data
set are carried by Tesco and at least one of the three other supermarkets. In our analysis we focus
on the primary shopping trip. According the Competition Commission's 2000 consumer survey
around 70% of households do their main grocery shopping just once a week, which means that
the majority of consumers is probably most interested in the total price of their primary shopping
9See http://www.tesco.com/todayattesco/pricecheck.shtml.
10This excludes smaller stores such as Tesco Metro and Express and Sainsbury's Local and Central.
13basket and not so much in the prices of individual items. The focus will therefore be on a basket
of regularly bought items. Another reason to focus on a basket instead of on individual items is
that a supermarket is a multi-product rm so a single-product model as described in Section 2
is probably not the right model when investigating individual products. A drawback of looking
at baskets of products instead of individual products is that behavior of consumers who go to
dierent supermarkets for each dierent product is not captured. Disregarding these consumers
can be justied by the survey evidence that the majority of people do their main grocery shopping
just once a week.
Price dierences for the basket across supermarkets allow us to identify the vertical production
dierentiation component, so it is important that the products included in our basket are carried by
all four food retailers. In addition, to be able to identify search costs we need to observe prices for
the items in our basket over time. Furthermore, we only include food and non-alcoholic beverage
items, as classied by the most recent list of representative items that the Oce of National
Statistics uses to construct the CPI (see Wingeld and Gooding, 2008). This leaves us with more
than a thousand products from which we can construct our shopping basket.
Including all food and non-alcoholic beverage items for which we have complete price informa-
tion in the shopping basket would result in an average price for the basket that is more than $1,500,
so to get a reasonable estimate of the search cost distribution we have to decrease the size of the
basket to more realistic proportions. One problem is that by constraining the size of the basket
we increase the number of potential shopping basket that can be constructed out of all available
items. About 64% of consumers spend less than $50 on their weekly shopping for groceries at
supermarkets (Competition Commission, 2000), and if we want to take this as the goal size of our
basket this means that without additional constraints we have to make an arbitrary choice among
millions of possible combinations of items.11 To deal with this we instead use a list of twenty-four
items used by comparison website mySupermarket.co.uk to track groceries expenditures.12 The
11One way to deal with this is to randomly selection items out of the pool of all available items and use these to
construct the basket. This can be repeated many times, where each randomly constructed basket is considered as one
price observation. Although this seems like an intuitive way to deal with the selection issues, a problem is that this
approach basically assumes that for a given store the prices of all randomly created baskets are drawn from the same
underlying distribution. Since baskets consists of underlying individual items, this requires a level of dependence and
coordination in pricing which seems highly unlikely, if possible at all. According to the central limit theorem a lack of
dependence will make the price distribution of the randomly constructed baskets converge to a normal distribution.
Although these normal distributions will have dierent means, and as such will give a clear ranking of the supermarket
chains in terms of prices which can be used to identify the store heterogeneity aspect of the model, it not useful for
estimating search costs. A normal distribution will appear no matter how consumer search, which means the price
distribution does not contain any information on consumer search behavior. This identication problem makes it
impossible to infer search costs of consumers using only observed prices.
12We thank mySupermarket for sharing this list with us.
14basket includes items like tea bags, milk, eggs, pasta, minced beef, corn 
akes, and rice. These
are all staple items and therefore likely to be of great importance for the nancial well-being of
the food retailers. Moreover, the fact that these items are tracked by mySupermarket.co.uk and
picked up by the popular press at regular intervals makes it likely that the supermarkets are es-
pecially interested in pricing strategies for these particular items.13 For some of the products on
the mySupermarket.co.uk shopping list we do not have a complete series of prices across all four
supermarkets. To deal with this we have replaced those products with similar items so that in
the end our basket comes very close to the one used by mySupermarket.co.uk.14 Table 1 gives an
overview of the products selected as well as some sampling statistics. Although prices for a few
products have not changed over the sampling period, for most items in the basket there is variation
in prices over time and across stores.
Mean Price Minimum Maximum Coecient of
Item (Std) Price Price Variation (100)
thick sliced white loaf 800g 0.73 (0.01) 0.72 0.75 1.80
bananas loose 0.78 (0.03) 0.77 0.85 3.65
golden delicious apples class 1 loose 1.38 (0.10) 1.00 1.49 7.17
mixed peppers 3 pack 1.32 (0.13) 1.00 1.38 10.25
cucumber portion 0.34 (0.02) 0.25 0.37 6.22
iceberg lettuce each class 1 0.73 (0.08) 0.37 0.84 10.23
tomatoes 6 pack 0.76 (0.14) 0.50 0.99 18.72
maris piper potatoes 2.5kg pack 1.96 (0.10) 1.48 1.99 5.20
whole milk 3.408ltr/6 pints 2.15 (0.06) 2.12 2.25 2.57
free range eggs medium box of 6 1.36 (0.00) 1.36 1.36 0.00
english butter salted 250g 0.93 (0.02) 0.89 0.94 2.36
cathedral city mild cheddar 400g 3.14 (0.19) 2.66 3.31 6.20
beef mince 500g 2.11 (0.34) 1.00 2.25 16.01
wafer thin smoked ham 500g 3.00 (0.05) 2.97 3.19 1.52
garden peas 142g 0.29 (0.00) 0.29 0.29 0.00
baked bean in tomato sauce 420g 0.34 (0.04) 0.31 0.42 12.97
dolmio original bolognese sauce 500g 1.32 (0.05) 1.00 1.34 3.60
strawberry jam 454g 0.69 (0.06) 0.45 0.79 8.92
silver spoon half spoon sugar 500g 0.92 (0.06) 0.84 0.97 6.11
corn
akes 500g 0.95 (0.00) 0.95 0.95 0.00
fusilli pasta twists 500g 0.75 (0.04) 0.69 0.79 5.94
basmati rice 1kg 1.80 (0.10) 1.74 1.99 5.67
80 teabags 250g 1.29 (0.04) 1.19 1.42 3.07
pure orange juice smooth 1 litre 0.85 (0.09) 0.58 0.88 10.31
Notes: The list is based on the basket of staple items mySupermarket.co.uk uses to track consumer
groceries expenditures. Prices are in British pounds. For each item we have 48 observations.
Table 1: Simple statistics for items in the basket
Tesco Pricecheck only compares prices of products at the big four supermarket chains in the
UK. Although most consumers will have more than four options for their grocery shopping this
13See for example http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7362676.stm.
14For a few product-store pairs a small number of weeks is missing. Since it is important to have a balanced panel
we have replaced these missing observations by the price of the week before.
15is not necessarily a constraint. Our model assumes all supermarket chains play the same mixed
strategy in utilities, so price data from one supermarket over time is already enough to estimate
search costs. However, we do need information on what supermarkets perceive as the number of
competitors, since that is a parameter in the equilibrium utility distribution. Twelve supermarkets
had an expected UK market share larger than 0.5% in 2007, which we will take as the number of
rms competing.
Although not all items in the basket are branded, all items are similar across stores in terms of
physical characteristics. Moreover, for generic products like eggs, milk, apples, and cucumbers it is
likely that consumers do not care much about the (in store) brand. Nevertheless, since our model
explicitly models quality dierences between supermarkets, perceived quality dierences between
in store brands, as well as dierences in other store characteristics will show up in our estimates.
As a results, supermarkets with better valued characteristics can ask higher prices on average.
4.2 Implications of the model
To investigate whether the right model is used to study search behavior of consumers in this
setting, we will rst check if some of the implications of the model, like random pricing and
persistent dierences in average price across stores, are observed in the data. As in Lach (2002), we
concentrate on the relative position of the stores in terms of price rankings, and how these positions
evolve over time, both before and after correcting for vertical product dierentiation.15
According to the model prices are randomly drawn from a distribution. Each store will have
its own price distribution to draw from and depending on the degree of rm heterogeneity there
will be more or less overlap in the supports of these distributions. At one extreme there is no
rm heterogeneity, the supports completely overlap, and price rankings are completely random.
At the other extreme stores are so much dierent that the supports do not overlap at all and
price rankings do not change. Figure 3(a) shows how the price rankings of the stores evolve over
time for the basket. Although Sainsbury's always had the highest prices for the basket and is
therefore persistently ranked fourth in terms of prices, there is variability in the rankings of the
other supermarkets. Most of the variety comes from Tesco and ASDA as Morrisons is stably
15In recent work it has been observed that a typical grocery product is sold at a regular price for a number of
time periods, whereas only once in a while the product is sold at a discount price (see, e.g., Pesendorfer, 2002; and
Hosken and Reien, 2004). An implication of this is that current prices depend on past prices. This seems to be at
odds with the implication of the search model in this paper that prices are random draws from some distribution,
since this means that prices are not predictable and that there is no correlation over time. However, an important
dierence between the papers mentioned above and this paper is that while they focus on single products, the focus
here is on baskets of goods.
16(a) Price rankings (b) Utility rankings
Figure 3: Rankings over time
ranked third in the second half of the sampling period. This suggests that a search model in which
consumers place the same value on each supermarket is not appropriate, since in such a model
rankings should be completely random. Notice that these ndings do not contradict our model,
since the model allows for non-
uctuating price rankings. Nevertheless, a clear prediction of the
model is that although price rankings may be constant, rankings in terms of utility should be
random. Figure 3(b) gives the utility rankings of the stores over time for all items together, where
utilities are calculated as in Section 3, i.e, the negative of the residuals of a regression of prices
on store dummies.16 Clearly, this looks much more like a random pattern. This can also be seen
in Table 2 where we give the percentage of prices and utilities in each quartile of respectively the
price and utility distribution for each of the supermarkets in our data. While in terms of prices the
supermarkets tend to spend most time in one quartile only, in terms of utilities it is more spread
out.
prices utilities
Quartile Tesco Sainsbury's Morrisons ASDA Tesco Sainsbury's Morrisons ASDA
q1 16.7 0.0 8.3 75.0 16.7 25.0 8.3 50.0
q2 58.3 0.0 25.0 16.7 58.3 16.7 41.7 16.7
q3 25.0 0.0 66.7 8.3 25.0 25.0 16.7 0.0
q4 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 33.3 41.7
Notes: In percentages.
Table 2: Quartile spent time in
To study this issue in more detail, Table 3 gives information about the time a rm spends in
each quartile of every week's price distribution. Stores change their relative position in the price
16See Table 4 on p.19 for the regression results.
17rankings, but usually not every week. For example, 42% of the price observations in the rst
quartile were for stores that had a price in this quartile for one successive week. Likewise, 25%
of prices in the rst quartile belong to stores that were in this quartile for three successive week.
Especially the stores that have a price within the third or fourth quartile stay there for many
weeks: at least 67% of stores for more than six weeks. Among supermarkets pricing in the rst
and second quartile there is more 
uctuation; prices are on average less than three successive weeks
in one of these quartiles and all stores keep their prices in these quartiles for at most four weeks.
Table 3 also looks at durations by quartile for utilities. Especially for the higher quartiles the mean
duration is lower compared to the same gures for the price distributions. In none of the quartiles
supermarkets price more than ve subsequent weeks.
prices utilities
duration q1 q2 q3 q4 q1 q2 q3 q4
1 week 41.7 25.0 8.3 0.0 33.3 75.0 25.0 16.7
2 weeks 0.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0
3 weeks 25.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 50.0
4 weeks 33.3 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3
5 weeks 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 41.7 0.0 41.7 0.0
6+ weeks 0.0 0.0 66.7 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
mean 2.5 2.7 6.2 12.0 3.2 1.5 3.0 3.0
median 3 3 8 12 3 1 2 3
max 4 4 8 12 5 3 5 4
Notes: In percentages.
Table 3: Durations by quartile
4.3 Estimation of search costs
We use the basket of twenty-four regularly bought items to estimate search costs. Figure 4(a)
gives a kernel estimate of the price density using prices of the basket of all supermarkets during
the twelve week sampling period. According to the search model presented in Section 2 the price
dispersion shown in this graph is explained as a combination of quality dierences between stores
and random pricing strategies. Because of the way utilities are dened in the model, utilities are
essentially prices controlled for quality dierences between stores. As described in the previous
section we use a regression of prices on store dummies to derive utilities.
Table 4 gives the results of the xed eects regression. Specication (A) has only store dummies
included, while specication (B) takes time eects into account as well. In both cases the R2 is
quite high, which means store heterogeneity explains a large part of the variation in the data. To
see whether the store xed eects are jointly signicant, an F-test is performed. As can be seen in
Table 4, the p-value for the F-test is equal to zero for both specications, which suggests that store
xed eects indeed matter. In specication (C) we replace the rm dummies with observed rm
18(a) Price density (b) Utility density
Figure 4: Price and utility density basket
characteristics like the estimated share of delicatessen in the sales mix, the estimated share of petrol
sales in the sales mix, and the average store size.17 We have picked these variables because the
share of delicatessen in the sales mix seems a reasonable proxy for the level of luxuriousness of the
chains, and because according to the Competition Commission's 2000 consumer survey, consumers
appreciate a large range of grocery products to choose from, as well as extra facilities such as a
petrol station. As shown in the table, the regression results indicate that although the average
store size is not signicantly dierent from zero, the other two variables can explain a large part of
the variation in prices across stores. Moreover, they move in the expected directions.
(A) (B) (C)
Constant 29.88 (0.06) 29.88 (0.06) 26.98 (0.51)
Tesco -0.30 -0.30 -
Sainsbury's 0.83 0.83 -
Morrisons -0.06 -0.06 -
ASDA -0.60 -0.60 -
Share of delicatessen in sales mix - - 0.85 (0.17)
Share of petrol in sales mix - - 0.07 (0.02)
Average store size (1,000 m3) - - 0.01 (0.07)
N 48 48 48
R2 0.61 0.75 0.61
Adjusted R2 0.58 0.65 0.58
p-value F-test 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Estimated specication (A) is with only
cross-section xed eects, specication (B) is with period xed eects as well.
Specication (C) is with observed characteristics only.
Table 4: Regression results
Figure 4(b) gives a kernel estimate of the utility density function, where the utilities are the
17The data is taken from Appendix 3.1 of the nal report of the Competition Commission's 2008 Groceries Market
Investigation (see Competition Commission, 2008).
19negatives of the residuals of the xed eects regression in specication (A). Figure 4(b) shows
that there is substantial utility dispersion. The utility density is right-skewed, which tells us that
although it is possible to encounter relative high utility levels, it happens with small probability.
This gives some indication that the share of consumers searching intensively will not be very large
in this market.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
N 12 10 14 12
# obs 48 48 48 48
1 0.71 (0.19) 0.76 (0.15) 0.68 (0.20) 0.61 (0.18)
2 0.20 (0.08) 0.18 (0.08) 0.22 (0.07) 0.33 (0.09)






N 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 0.08 (0.11) 0.06 (0.07) 0.10 (0.13) 0.06 (0.07)
vj   rj 3.04 3.55 2.77 2.15
LL 16.95 18.55 15.66 13.29
KS F(p) 1.12 1.13 1.10 1.10
KS L(u) 1.27 1.37 1.16 0.64
Notes: Estimated standard errors in parenthesis. Column (1)
gives our main results. In columns (2) and (3) we change the
number of rms to respectively N = 10 and N = 14. Column
(4) gives results using utilities corrected for time xed eects (see
specication (B) in Table 4).
Table 5: Estimation results
The calculated utilities are used in the maximum likelihood procedure described in Section 3.
The estimation results are presented in Table 5. In Column (1) we give the estimated parameters
using the negative of the residuals of specication (A) in Table 4. The estimated share of consumers
searching once is 0:71 and highly signicant. The estimated share of consumers searching twice is
with a estimate coecient of 0:20 and a standard error of 0:08 signicantly dierent from zero as
well. The percentage of consumers searching for all stores around, although insignicant, is about
8%. All other k's are not signicantly dierent from zero. What is striking is that consumers
either search for prices at one or two, or at all chains. The estimated share of consumers searching
once or twice is around 91%, while only 8% of consumers compare all prices. A similar picture
arises when the estimated search cost cdf and pdf are graphed, as in Figure 5(a). The 
at part
in the lower part of the search cost distribution indicates that consumers either have search cost
of more than $0.15, or they have search cost almost equal to zero. Finally, Table 5 shows that
the estimated maximum price-cost margin vj   rj for the basket is $3.04, which implies average
price-to-cost margins between 8% and 9%.18
18Smith (2004) reports gross margins that are between 11% and 14% and that revenue minus all store costs as a
20(a) Main speci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cations
Figure 5: Estimated search cost distribution
As can be seen in Figure 6(a) the model does quite well in explaining the data since the estimated
price cumulative distribution function, as indicated by the solid line, is quite close to the empirical
one. The results of a more formal Kolmogorov-Smirnov test are put in Table 5.19 Since the KS
F(p) value in the rst column is below the 95%-critical value of the KS-statistic, which is 1.36,
we cannot reject that the prices are drawn from the estimated price distribution. Of course, given
that around 61% of the variation can be explained by store xed eects, a substantial part of the
t in Figure 6(a) is due to non-search related causes. Since the utility distribution is derived by
controlling for store xed eects, in principle the t of the utility distribution is a better indicator for
determining to what extent search matters. Figure 6(b) shows the estimated utility cdf compared
to the calculated utility cdf. As can be seen in this graph, the estimated utility distribution is close
to the calculated utility distribution. That the model does quite well in explaining utilities can also
be concluded from the corresponding KS L(u) value in Table 5, which is below the critical value
of 1.36.
To check for the robustness of the results to dierent specications of the utility function we
have also estimated the model using a dierent number of rms. Column (2) in Table 5 gives
the estimated parameters for N = 10 whereas Column (3) gives the results for N = 14 rms.
In addition we have plotted the estimated search cost distributions for N = 10 and N = 14 in
Figure 5(b). The results do not change signicantly by changing the number of rms. We have also
estimated the model using utilities calculated from the time xed eects specication (B) in Table
4. Column (4) of Table 5 shows that controlling for time xed eects does not change the estimates
percentage of revenue is between 6% and 10% for the four supermarkets for the year 2000.
19In this table KS F(p) is calculated as
p
m  m, where m is the number of observations and m is the maximum
absolute dierence over all prices between the estimated price cdf and the empirical price cdf.
21(a) Fit price distribution (b) Fit utility distribution
Figure 6: Fit price and utility distributions
that much either. The dashed curve in Figure 5(b) gives the corresponding estimated search cost
distribution. Although there are dierences in the magnitude of search costs, the results do not
change much in a qualitative sense.
4.4 Relative importance of vertical product dierentiation and search
A question of interest is how important vertical product dierentiation and search are in explaining
price dispersion. To answer this question we compare the estimates of the search cost model with
vertical product dierentiation to estimates from a model without vertical product dierentiation.
Figure 7(a) gives the estimated search cost cdf if it is assumed the stores are homogeneous instead
of vertically dierentiated. What is striking is that estimated search costs are now much higher.
Given that around 61% of the variation in prices can be attributed to dierences between stores and
that this is no longer captured in dierent valuations across stores but in the prices itself, the gains
from searching are much higher in the homogeneous search model. To be able to explain observed
prices, the population of consumers should have higher search cost on average and should search
less than in the search model with vertical product dierentiation. Note that the homogenous
search model does only slightly worse in explaining the observed prices, but as reported earlier, it
fails to explain patterns at a more detailed level, so on those grounds the homogeneous products
model can be rejected for this data set.
Finally, in Figure 7(b) we have plotted the empirical price distribution together with the tted
price distribution assuming rm heterogeneity is the only rationale for observed dierences in
prices. What is striking is that the model does a poor job in explaining high prices and especially
22(a) Search cost when no rm heterogeneity (b) Fit model without search
Figure 7: Estimated search costs without rm heterogeneity and t without search
low prices. This is not surprising since in a model without search, deviations from the stores'
averages prices cannot be explained, unless rm characteristics are changing over time. However,
given the relatively short sampling period it seems unlikely that this explains the pricing pattern
we observe.
4.5 Organic groceries
Our data set includes prices on organic items, which provides us with a natural case to investigate
how search costs relate to consumer demographics: organic food purchasers tend to have distinct
demographics and several studies have shown that consumers of organic grocery items have on
average higher incomes. If the search behavior of organic food purchasers is aected by this we
would expect to see this back in our search cost estimates. To test for this we conduct an experiment
in which we compare the search cost estimates using the twenty-four non-organic items discussed
above to estimates obtained using a basket of only organic items.
Organic food has quickly become more popular the last few years and is now a multi-billion
dollar industry. Although organic farming is growing rapidly, it still accounts for only a small
percentage of overall farming. Several studies have shown that organic food purchasers have distinct
demographic proles. In an overview of the empirical literature on organic food consumers Hughner
et al. (2007) nd that a consistent nding across studies is that consumers of organic food are
female, have children living in the household, and are older. There is mixed evidence on the eects
of income and eduction on organic purchase behavior.
Since organic food purchases tend to have distinct demographics, one would expect them to
have dierent search costs as well. To test if this is indeed the case in our data we have created
23an organic basket by replacing each item in the original basket with an organic equivalent. Only
for one of the items { sugar { we could not nd an organic equivalent, so we kept non-organic
sugar in the organic basket. For all other items we could nd an organic item which more or less
resembled the original item. In Table 6 we provide some summary statistics for individual items
in the organic basket. Especially prices of produce items seem to be more dispersed than their
non-organic equivalents. Overall, the average coecient of variation for the items in the organic
basket is about one percent point higher than that of the standard basket, which means the gains
from searching are higher for the organic items. Only Tesco and Sainsbury's carry all items in the
organic basket, so we have to focus on these two stores only. However, for the identication of
underlying search costs we only need variation over time and not necessarily across stores, so we
do not need the prices for other stores to get an estimate of the search cost distribution. We set
the number of stores equal to ve to take into account that not all supermarket chains in the UK
sell organic products.
Mean Price Minimum Maximum Coecient of
Product (Std) Price Price Variation (100)
organic thick sliced wholemeal bread 800g 0.99 (0.08) 0.89 1.09 8.42
organic bananas bunch of 6 1.39 (0.25) 1.00 1.59 17.96
organic gala polybag apple 2.24 (0.26) 1.99 2.49 11.40
organic sweet pointed peppers 1.81 (0.26) 1.58 2.09 14.29
organic whole cucumber 0.93 (0.09) 0.74 0.99 9.96
organic watercress 1.32 (0.20) 1.00 1.49 15.03
organic baby plum tomatoes 250g 1.66 (0.24) 1.27 1.99 14.70
organic red potatoes 2.5kg 1.91 (0.26) 0.97 2.15 13.78
organic whole milk 3.408 litre 2.39 (0.02) 2.38 2.50 1.03
organic eggs medium box of 6 1.82 (0.00) 1.82 1.82 0.00
organic butter 250g 1.17 (0.07) 1.12 1.27 6.07
organic farmhouse medium cheddar 320g 2.69 (0.23) 2.18 2.95 8.94
organic beef mince 500g 2.98 (0.02) 2.95 2.99 0.62
organic wafer thin ham 100g 2.79 (0.10) 2.69 2.89 3.66
organic petits pois 750g 2.56 (0.09) 2.54 2.99 3.59
organic baked beans 420g 0.45 (0.00) 0.45 0.45 0.00
dolmio organic bolognese sauce 500g 2.17 (0.18) 1.92 2.29 8.22
fairtrade organic strawberry conserve 340g 1.39 (0.00) 1.39 1.39 0.00
silver spoon half spoon sugar 500g 0.88 (0.04) 0.84 0.97 4.59
organic corn
akes 500g 0.83 (0.15) 0.44 0.89 18.23
organic fusilli 500g 0.84 (0.01) 0.84 0.85 0.60
organic basmati rice 500g 1.56 (0.14) 1.39 1.68 9.11
organic 80 teabags 250g 1.41 (0.00) 1.41 1.42 0.14
grove fresh pure organic orange juice 1 litre 2.49 (0.00) 2.49 2.49 0.00
Notes: Prices are in British pounds. For each item we have 24 observations.
Table 6: Simple statistics for items in the organic basket
To obtain utilities we again take the negatives of the residuals of a regression of prices on rm
dummies. A major dierence with the results in the previous subsection is that rm heterogeneity
seems the explain a larger part of the variation in the data; for the organic basket 79% of the
24variation in prices is explained by the rm dummies while this is only 61% for the non-organic
basket.
Figure 8(a) gives the estimated search cost distribution for the organic basket as well as search
costs for the original basket. Although the dierences are small, the curves show that estimated
search costs are higher for the organic basket than for the basket we used in the previous section.
The estimated share of people searching for all stores around is about two percent point smaller
for the organic basket, while a slightly higher percentage of people searches only once for the non-
organic basket. Even though these estimated shares do not dier a lot across the two baskets,
because the organic basket is more expensive on average the overall estimated search cost distribu-
tion puts more weight on higher search cost values for the organic basket. One of the demographics
mentioned above that could explain the higher search costs for organic food purchasers is the age
dierence between the groups of consumers: older consumers tend to be richer. Using a data set of
actual consumer search behavior for online book purchases, De los Santos (2008) nds a signicant
negative relationship between household income and time spent searching, which suggests a positive
relation between search costs and income. In addition De los Santos' (2008) nds weak evidence
that households with children present as well as within the 40-54 age group spend less time search-
ing online. As mentioned above, consumers with these demographics tend to be over-represented
among the organic food purchasers, which helps to explain dierences in estimated search costs
between the organic and non-organic basket.
(a) With vertical product dierentiation (b) Without vertical product dierentiation
Figure 8: Estimated search costs organic versus standard basket
In Figure 8(b) we compare estimated search cost distributions in case we would have ignored
heterogeneity among the two stores for which we have sucient data on the items in the organic
basket. Since a much bigger share of the variance is now explained by quality dierences between
25stores, it is not surprising that we end up with very dierent results. In fact, estimated search costs
are now much lower for the organic basket than for the non-organic basket. This illustrates that
ignoring store heterogeneity might lead to potentially misleading results.
4.6 The eects of a change in search costs
In a recent paper Armstrong (2008) argues that especially when there are information frictions com-
petition policy may occasionally harm some consumers. For instance, if some fraction of consumers
use price comparison tools and observe all prices while others are uninformed, the average price
paid by the uninformed shoppers might rise. In addition Armstrong argues that in some settings
uninformed consumers exert a negative externality on the informed consumers. Therefore a policy
to increase the use of price-comparison sites might not have a major impact on price levels. In this
section we take a look at these issues by studying the eects of an exogenous shift in search costs
on the equilibrium utility and price distributions for the standard basket. More specically, we let
the share of consumers with very low search costs (the shoppers or informed consumers) increase
from eight to respectively nine and ten percent, while keeping the other structural parameters in
the model xed. Such a shift in the search cost distribution could for example occur as a result of
more people using price comparison sites such as Tesco Price Check or mySupermarket, thereby
reducing their search costs to very low levels.
(a) Fitted search cost cdf (b) Change in percentage shoppers
Figure 9: Simulated search cost cdfs
To be able to calculate the new equilibrium after a change in the search cost distribution we
rst need to obtain a smooth estimate of the search cost distribution. For this purpose we t a
mixture of log-normal distributions to the estimated search cost points for the standard basket.
26The tted search cost density derived is
^ g(c) = 0:91  lognormal(c; 1:07;0:31) + 0:09  lognormal(c; 6:00;2:26):
In Figure 9(a) the tted curve and the estimated points of the search cost distribution are plotted
together. We model the change in the percentage of shoppers by adding consumers to the lower end
of the search cost distribution. In Figure 9(b) it is shown how the tted search cost distribution
compares to the distributions with the extra shoppers added.20
Basket Basket Basket Basket
estimated tted 9% shoppers 10% shoppers
N 12 12 12 12
# obs 48 48 48 48
1 0.71 (0.19) 0.73 0.78 0.84
2 0.20 (0.08) 0.18 0.12 0.05
3 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00






N 1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
N 0.08 (0.11) 0.08 0.09 0.10
vj   rj 3.04 3.04 3.04 3.04
E[u] 0.75 0.71 0.56 ({20.9%) 0.37 ({47.7%)
E[maxfu1;u2g] 1.01 0.97 0.80 ({17.3%) 0.58 ({40.2%)
E[maxfu1;:::;uNg] 1.64 1.61 1.50 ({6.9%) 1.33 ({17.0%)
E[p] 29.84 29.88 30.02 (+0.5%) 30.21 (+1.1%)
E[] 0.18 0.18 0.20 (+7.0%) 0.21 (+15.7%)
Notes: Column 1: estimated standard errors in parenthesis. Columns 3 and 4:
percent changes relative to the tted equilibrium in parenthesis.
Table 7: The eects of a change in search costs: estimated and simulated parameter values
Using the tted and the modied search cost distributions, we estimate the eects of a change
in the percentage shoppers. The results are reported in Table 7. In addition, Figure 10 gives the
simulated price and utility distributions using the tted and modied search cost distributions.
As can be seen in the graphs, a higher share of consumers with low search costs leads to a lower
expected utility and less competitive pricing. For example, a one percent-point increase in shoppers
leads to an expected utility level which is almost twenty-one percent lower. The expected utility
levels encountered by people searching more than once is less aected, although the expected utility
level for people searching N times still goes down by almost seven percent. As shown before a large
share of the variation in prices is explained by store heterogeneity, which means the eect on prices
will not be as large as for utility levels, but still prices are expected to go up by a half percent
20We have obtained these search cost distributions by changing the mixture proportions from 0.91-0.09 to respec-
tively 0.90-0.10 and 0.89-0.11.
27for the one percent-point increase and more than one percent for the two percent-point increase
in shoppers. This counter intuitive result can be explained by a change in focus of the stores: an
increase in the share of intensively searching consumers makes it more costly to oer attractive
deals. As a result stores start focusing more on the consumers with high search costs. Since a lot
of them do not compare prices, it is optimal for the rms to start putting more mass on higher
prices. As reported in Table 7 this will make it optimal for some consumers to shift from searching
twice to searching once, leading stores to oer even less attractive deals. As a result the prots of
the stores increase by as much as almost sixteen percent in case of a two percent-point increase in
shoppers.
(a) Utility distribution (b) Price distribution
Figure 10: Eects of change in search costs
5 Conclusions
This paper presented a non-sequential search model that allows for vertical product dierentiation.
Firms oering distinct products at dierent prices can be seen as competing in terms of utilities. It
is shown that a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium in utility levels exists. Firms draw utilities
from a common utility distribution, but because valuations and unit costs are dierent across rms,
rms have dierent price distributions. A result of this is that rms randomize their prices, but
over dierent supports, so that mean prices are dierent across rms over time, something which
so far could not be explained by existing search models.
It is shown how to estimate the model using price data only. Utilities are calculated by taking
the negative of the residuals of a xed eects regression of prices on store dummies. The calculated
utilities then serve as an input to a maximum likelihood estimation procedure in order to estimate
the underlying search cost distribution.
28The method is applied to data from the four biggest supermarkets in the United Kingdom in the
period August till October 2008. We nd that around 61% of the observed variation in prices is due
to rm specic eects. The model does reasonably well in explaining observed prices for a basket
of twenty-four staple items. Estimates indicate that most consumers search only once or twice,
which is consistent with ndings of the Competition Commission. Moreover, a comparison with a
basket of similar organic items indicates that organic food purchasers in general have higher search
costs. Finally, we illustrate how the estimated search cost distribution can be used to simulate how
changes in the share of consumers with low search costs aects equilibrium behavior of consumers
and supermarkets. We nd that an in
ow of consumers with very low search costs leads to lower
expected utility levels and higher average prices.
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